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A New Typology of Electoral Violence: Insights from Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Existing literature on election violence has focused on how violence suppresses voter participation or shapes their preferences. Yet, there are other targets of election violence beyond voters who have so far received little attention: candidates and government agencies. By intimidating rival candidates into dropping out of the race, political hopefuls can literally reduce the number of competitors and increase their likelihood of winning. Likewise, aspiring candidates can target government agencies perceived to be responsible for holding elections to push for electorally beneficial decisions. In this paper, we introduce a new typology of electoral violence and utilize new data of election violence that occur around executive elections in Indonesia from 2005 through 2012. The types of violence we identified differ in these ways: a) Of all cases of electoral violence observed in this article, most incidents were targeted towards candidates and government bodies; b) candidates are generally targeted before elections, whereas voter-targeting incidents are spread out evenly before and after elections and government-targeted violence tends to occur afterwards; c) pre-election violence is concentrated in formerly separatist areas, but post-election violence is more common in districts with prior ethnocommunal violence. These distinctions stress the importance of examining when and why different strategies are adopted.

KEYWORDS

Candidate-targeting attacks; election; electoral violence; Indonesia voter mobilization

Introduction

It is well known that elections sometimes can be violent. In the 2015 presidential election in Sri Lanka, gunmen opened fire and wounded three supporters at a rally of the main opposition candidate, Maithripala Sirisena. Two officials of the Election Commission were targeted during the same week.[1] In Côte D'Ivoire, pro-government militias systematically killed hundreds of opposition supporters in the 2000 election.[2] In the Philippines, a number of assassinations, drive-by shootings, and ambushes of political candidates and their campaign members occurred in hotspot areas during the 2010 elections.[3] In 2006 in Aceh, Indonesia, a group of armed men stopped a candidate's campaign bus in its tracks, beat the candidate and his running-mate, and destroyed the bus. In response to the disqualification of 450 predominantly Sunni candidates from Iraq's March 2010 parliamentary election, a fresh wave of protests erupted, demanding the overturning of the candidate ban.[4] On the surface, these incidents would all fall under the broad category of

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electoral violence.[5] And yet, they are different forms of violence, with very different targets of intimidation. The shooting at supporters at an opposition candidate political rally is an act of voter intimidation. The drive-by shootings and attacks on a candidate's campaign bus are acts of violence aimed at the candidates themselves and those close to them. The protests over candidate bans in the 2010 parliamentary election in Iraq were directed towards government bodies responsible for electoral protocols and holding elections.

Thus far, this distinction among voter-, candidate-, and government agency-targeted violence has been overlooked in the literature. Instead, much of what we know about electoral violence has been based on clashes that target voters. For example, Steven Wilkinson argued that incumbent candidates would allow Hindu-Muslim riots to unfold before competitive elections to prime voters to vote along ethnic lines.[6] Ursula Daxecker studies how intimidation of voters before an election tends to increase with the presence of international observers on election day.[7] Denize Aksoy finds that upcoming elections in permissive democracies increases the probability of terrorist attacks.[8] Intergroup riots, terror attacks, police violence against civilians, and clashes between supporters—these manifestations of electoral violence mobilize a large number of individuals with many degrees of separation from the candidates themselves, and follow a dynamic wholly different from candidate-targeting attacks.

In this article, we take seriously the criticism that Paul Staniland made that electoral violence encompasses many different kinds of violence and that even the best sources of empirical data on electoral violence do not provide much information of what makes an incident "electoral."[9] We argue that different forms of violence follow distinct patterns and that causal explanations about electoral violence would benefit from having much more fine-grained empirical data and typologies of violence. To this end, we focus on Indonesia, a country that has experienced election-related violence since its democratic transition nearly 20 years ago. We built an original dataset on direct local executive (DLE) elections and combined it with a new subnational event dataset of violence, the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS). With this micro-level data, we develop new typologies of electoral violence based on the target of intimidation—candidate-targeting violence, government-aimed violence, voter-targeting violence—and show that these types of violence follow different patterns.[10] A focus on these different types of election violence would give us a clearer and richer understanding of the phenomenon.

Taking into consideration the timing, location, and proximity to elections of each incident, we make the following observations: a) Whereas candidate-intimidating attacks tend to fall before elections, attacks that mobilize voters can happen throughout an election cycle, and incidents that target government agencies tend to occur after elections; b) In Indonesia, the dominant types of election violence that occured are the candidate-targeting attacks and government-aimed violence, not voter-targeting incidents; c) Spatially, more pre-election violence occurs in formerly separatist areas, whereas post-election incidents tend to concentrate in areas with prior ethnocommunal violence. These findings, while descriptive in nature, contribute to the literature on electoral violence by highlighting the importance of disaggregating electoral violence and using micro data that provide rich details of events.

This article begins with a discussion of existing typologies of electoral violence and the publicly available data on electoral violence which shape much of the current empirical literature on elections-related violence. We then introduce our new typologies of

candidate-targeting, government-aimed, and voter-targeting violence. The subsequent section provides an overview of the Indonesian context, and highlights why studying post-Soeharto Indonesia would be a good choice both for methodological and substantive reasons. Next, we describe the data and show the distribution of electoral violence in Indonesia generally, and electoral violence specifically based on the typologies we have developed. The article then continues with a discussion of how similar patterns and phenomena have been reported in other parts of the world, and that a serious inquiry into election violence based on the identity of its targets is necessary. The final section concludes with implications of our findings and offers a set of potential hypotheses to test in future empirical works on electoral violence.

Relevant Literature

Much of the empirical findings on electoral violence have relied on the typologies scholars have developed on electoral violence and the publicly available empirical data on electoral violence. In this section, we discuss how these have shaped what we know about electoral violence, and the questions that remain unanswered.

Current typologies of electoral violence

The study of electoral violence has been criticized for lumping various kinds of violence together, which makes measuring, comparing, and theorizing more complicated.[11] Given the broad definition of electoral violence, scholars have sorted electoral violence along different dimensions. Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor argued that electoral violence can be subdivided along three dimensions: its timing with respect to elections, involved actors, and intensity of violence.[12] With regards to timing, electoral violence can be distinguished between violence that occurs before and after an election.[13] With respect to involved actors, electoral violence has been further divided into clashes sponsored by the incumbent and/or government (and those acting on their behalf), and attacks mounted by opposition candidates (and those acting on their behalf). A third subcategorization of electoral violence Straus and Taylor have proposed is one based on intensity of violence.[14] They believe that there is a categorical difference between electoral violence where some protesters were beaten by the police versus electoral violence where the security forces systematically killed or kidnapped hundreds of pro-opposition activists.

Another way scholars have categorized electoral violence is exemplified in Staniland's typologies of electoral violence, defined along the kinds of actors engaged in violence and their goals.[15] Based on these dimensions, Staniland[16] identified seven types of electoral violence, where the actors engaged in violence can be state actors, non-state actors linked to the regime, opposition groups, and unaligned actors, and their goals can be distinguished between intra-systemic and anti-systemic ones. Actors whose goals are intra-systemic are those who desire to win within the context of an existing institutional system, whereas actors whose goals are anti-systemic are the ones who seek to overturn the current system.

These typologies are helpful, because they inform the hypotheses that can be examined empirically. The distinction between pre- and post-election violence,[17] for example, is useful because it clarifies whether actors are mobilizing violence to influence voters'

information, preferences, and participation in anticipation of an upcoming election, or whether they mount attacks in the aftermath of announced election results.[18] The separation between types of actors and their goals will inform the kinds of violence they are likely to mount, given their interests and coordination constraints. Straus and Taylor suggest that because incumbents presumably would have control over the state security apparatus, the forms of violence they would launch would look very different from those that challengers would likely adopt.[19] Incumbent-sponsored violence would be expressed in the form of government repression, whereas challenger-driven violence would be more likely to take shape in the form of protests and rebellions.[20] That these forms of electoral violence are sufficiently distinct from each other is implicitly recognized in studies that analyze incumbent-led electoral violence separately from opposition-led violence.[21]

Commonly used data on electoral violence

Except for a handful of studies that examine electoral violence sub-nationally, many empirical works on electoral violence have relied on three cross-national data sources: the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset,[22] the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED),[23] and the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD).[24]

Version 4.0 of the NELDA data is a global dataset of national presidential, legislative, parliamentary, and consultative assembly elections in countries with more than half a million in population from 1945 through 2006. This dataset provides information on whether there were riots and protests after elections, whether the government used violence against demonstrators, whether there was significant violence that led to civilian deaths before, during, and after the election, and the outcomes of these clashes (e.g., whether there was a vote-recount, whether a leader was replaced). This dataset provides very rich and systematic information on national elections worldwide, yet does not record within-country duration, onset, location, and intensity of violence. Furthermore, because the dataset captures only national elections, it is silent on elections and violence dynamics that may be at work at the local level, where local elections are more routine and the stakes are not as high as winning (or losing) the national elected seats.

The other two datasets that many scholars have used to examine elections-related violence are event-level, cross-national datasets. Version 6 of the ACLED dataset reports incidents of social conflicts in all countries in Africa, from 1997 through 2015. The types of social conflicts included in the dataset are as follows: civil and communal conflicts, violence against civilians, remote violence, rioting, and protesting. Every event is an observation, and events that last multiple days are recorded as a separate event on a daily basis. ACLED also records the identity of actors involved in violence (i.e., government, rebels, militias, ethnic groups, political organizations, and civilians), reports estimated casualty levels of each incident, and captures the location and date of each event.

Likewise, Version 3.1 of SCAD is an event-level, cross-national dataset of all countries in Africa, plus Mexico, Central America, and the Carribean from 1990 through 2013. This dataset records various kinds of social conflicts—demonstrations, riots, strikes, extra-government violence, intra-government violence, pro-government repression—along with the social, political, and communal identity of the perpetrators and targets of violence in every incident.

Like the ACLED dataset, the SCAD dataset also reports the date, location, duration, and associated casualty levels. Where SCAD differs from ACLED is that SCAD reports the number of participants involved in each incident and the issue that triggered the event (e.g., elections, economy, religious and ethnic discrimination, environmental degradation).

Because the ACLED and SCAD datasets are set up in this manner, scholars can use them to examine questions regarding spatial and temporal distributions of violence, duration and intensity of violence, as well as identity of involved actors. However, the ACLED dataset does not provide information on whether the civil conflicts recorded are elections-related, which means scholars wanting to examine whether elections trigger violence with this data would have to infer from the timing and clustering of events around elections that violence was elections-related.[25] The SCAD dataset specifies whether an event is triggered by elections; however, it stops short of providing narrative accounts of the events. Narratives would be useful because they would allow interested scholars to mine the text and interdependently evaluate whether and how an incident is related to elections.

What we Know so far

Given the existing typologies and available data, much of what we know about electoral violence concerns the distribution of violence, actors involved, and intensity of violence. Those who have examined government-sponsored electoral violence, for example, have found that incumbents are more likely to use violence if they fear losing their hold on power and that they do not face institutional constraints on promoting violence.[26] Incumbents may want to use violence, but would not do so if they will likely be penalized later for allowing violence to unfold.

This logic of the deterrent effect of institutional constraints has also been used to explain violence (or the lack thereof) on election day itself. Examining elections in Africa from 1990 through 2009, Daxecker finds that the presence of international observers on election day increases the likelihood of violence during campaign periods because incumbents and non-state actors are less willing to intimidate voters and opposition candidates under the watch of international observers.[27]

Institutions may also encourage electoral violence. In a cross-national study of elections in Africa from 1990 through 2010, Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund argue that countries with majoritarian electoral systems, large excluded ethnic groups, and significant economic inequalities are more likely to experience electoral violence because the stakes of winning an election are higher than in countries where seats are allocated using a proportional representative system.[28] When engagement with formal political institutions does not produce favorable results, some may opt to use violence as an alternative form of political engagement.[29] Some scholars have examined this empirically and shown that post-election violence is more likely when there are suspicions of fraud,[30] where there was prior violence before an election,[31] and when international observers condemn the accuracy of announced election results.[32]

Beyond institutions, some scholars have also argued that competitiveness of elections provokes aspiring candidates to use violence to influence either voter participation or preferences. In explaining Hindu-Muslim riots in India, Wilkinson argues that incumbents are more likely to allow violence to unfold when they are faced with competitive elections and where they need to prime voters to vote along ethnic lines.[33] In other words,

pre-election riots serve as a very "brutal campaign expenditure," which shapes voters' preferences at the ballot boxes.[34] Similarly, Paul Collier and Pedro Vicente argue that pre-election violence is primarily used to suppress voter turnout.[35] In municipal elections in Mexico, scholars have found that high crime areas tend to suffer much lower voter participation.[36] Beyond determining turnout, violence could also affect electoral outcomes by shaping voters' preferences for particular candidates. In the 2104 presidential election in Colombia, Michael Weintraub, Juan Vargas, and Thomas Flores found that the pro-peace candidate, Juan Santos, had more support in communities with moderate levels of insurgent violence and much less support in communities with very high and low levels of prior violence.[37]

Scholars have also linked the onset of electoral violence to the supply of people willing to fight. Andrea Colombo, Olivia D'Aoust, and Olivier Sterck demonstrate that in Burundi, demobilized rebel combatants act as "specialists in violence" for hire by local elites interested in stirring up violence during an election cycle.[38] A similar relationship has been observed in Sierra Leone, where the presence of young, unemployed men predicts higher levels of electoral violence.[39] Stefan Dercon and Roxana Gutierrez-Romero argue that countries with a high presence of politically connected gangs and land disputes are more likely to experience electoral violence.[40] Kathleen Klaus and Matthew Mitchell report a similar finding where they argue that electoral violence in a multiethnic context rife with land grievances depends in part on politicians' ability to convince voters that their rights and access to land hangs on the outcome of an election.[41]

There is a lot that we already know about electoral violence. But we know relatively little about the forms of violence used by and directed at particular actors. Do incumbent candidates disproportionately incite more pre-election violence than opposition candidates? If so, what mode of violence would they use and whom would they target? Do they rely on repression, or do they incite supporters to riot against each other, or would they try to intimidate rival candidates into dropping out of the race? If opposition candidates were to rely on violence as a strategy, what types of violence would they use and why? Answering these questions would need not only more fine-grained micro data about incidents of electoral violence, but also a recognition that there are more types of violence than what we have already acknowledged. This paper attempts to address both.

A target-based typology: Voters, candidates, and government agencies

In this section, we introduce a new typology of electoral violence, defined based on the targets of intimidation. We build upon earlier works that recognize the importance of disaggregating electoral violence based on the identity of engaged actors and their goals.[42] Where we differ from earlier analyses is that we shift the attention away from perpetrators of violence—typically lumped as "government" and "opposition"[43]—to the targets of intimidation. We also narrow our focus to strategic violence designed to reduce the competitiveness of elections to the perpetrators' benefit. As demonstrated in the prior section, existing empirical works have mostly focused on how violence intimidates voters into voting for particular candidates and/or influencing their turnout on election day. Scholars have written extensively about incumbent intimidation and repression of pro-opposition voters, as well as politicians' manipulation of ethnic loyalties around elections to prime voters to vote along ethnic lines. In our paper, we group these incidents that

affect voters' electoral decisions under the category of voter-targeting violence. We define voter-targeting violence broadly as any kind of election-related violence that affects voters' preferences and participation in elections. This type of targeting can take shape in various ways, as long as it affects voters. For example, voters may be targeted by violence during campaign rallies, acts of terror in public spaces, clashes between supporters of rival candidates, and kidnapping, killing, and assault of voters for their known support for particular candidates.

We believe there are two other oft-overlooked targets of violence that—once intimidated—can take actions that would yield similar electoral outcomes. The first are the candidates themselves and those close to them, and the second is a government agency, broadly defined, perceived to be responsible for creating, enforcing, and monitoring electoral rules and procedures during an election.[44] Given these targets of violence, we offer a target-based typology that distinguishes electoral violence into voter-targeting, candidate-targeting, and government-aimed violence. Candidate-targeting violence targets the candidates themselves and those around them by intimidating them into withdrawing and/or physically and forcefully removing them from the race. Through threats, torture, kidnapping of the candidates themselves, vandalism and destruction of their private property, or intimidation and violence against the candidates' family members, friends, and campaign team members, candidate-targeted violence can effectively change election results if it leads to the candidates being (in)voluntarily removed from the race.

The difference between candidate- and voter-targeting violence lies in the identity of those intimidated. Violence that targets those who are personally acquainted and close to the candidates such that their injuries would affect the candidates directly is considered to be candidate-targeted. Violence that targets voters at large who do not have any direct relationship with the candidates is categorized as voter-targeting. Government-aimed violence is violence mounted against a government agency responsible for monitoring and enforcing rules of elections. This type of violence can be made manifest in the forms of vandalism, protests, boycotts, or intimidation of government employees, with the purpose of demanding the government agency to reverse its decisions that were perceived to unfairly disadvantage certain candidates (and benefit others). For example, in response to a disqualification of a popular candidate, supporters may launch violent demonstrations, threaten election committee members, and organize boycotts. Likewise, it is possible that candidates and their supporters may launch protests demanding that rival candidates be disqualified from the race.

The distinction between voter-, candidate-, and government-targeted violence is necessary for both practical and methodological reasons. Practically, we articulate this distinction because candidates are often targeted with violence in various parts of the world, and yet we know little about the dynamics of candidate-targeting violence.

Beyond that, it is also important to study these types of violence because they can serve similar goals (i.e., altering election results), but they may operate under very different constraints and modes of coordination. For example, it may be much cheaper to hire a pair of assassins to murder a candidate than to provoke a riot between large groups of supporters. Similarly, systematically repressing pro-opposition supporters would require coordination and resources ranging from collaboration with the state police to contracting of non-state militias, whereas intimidating the opposition candidate herself into withdrawing from the race may involve comparatively fewer stealthy acts of vandalism,

anonymous threats, and physical violence. Burning down an election commission office in protest of its decision to disqualify a candidate before an election may be a more effective strategy to get a desired candidate reinstated than to threaten a rival candidate into withdrawing from the race. The differences in constraints and coordination required between these three types of violence implies that these strategies may be available and attractive to different types of candidates, in different environments, and at different times within the electoral cycle. To the extent that systematic differences exist, these types of electoral violence would follow different patterns. As the section on election patterns in Indonesia in this paper later shows, this is precisely the case. Because of differing patterns between these types of violence, methodologically it is important to disaggregate them lest empirical analyses would over- or under-estimate the effects of predictors on a particular type of electoral violence.

We hope that these distinctions would push forward inquiries about electoral violence to examine questions that thus far have remained unanswered. For example, what drives the use of voter-targeting violence over candidate-targeting attacks? Given the presumably lower costs and less visibility involved in candidate-targeting attacks, are there structural factors that make some elections more prone to certain types of attacks? Answering these questions would require fine-grained micro data of electoral violence. With the recent release of the NVMS data on violence in Indonesia, such analysis is now possible.

The case of Indonesia

Indonesia is a good case for studying electoral violence for various reasons. Indonesia looks relatively similar to many other middle-income, recently democratized countries that are occasionally plagued with violence. After 32 years of authoritarian rule under Soeharto, the country transitioned to democracy in 1998 and has since embarked on broad sweeping political and economic reforms. Among others, Indonesia implemented a big-bang decentralization, which grants political and fiscal authority to local governments at the municipal and district levels, allows for the creation of new administrative units, and requires that local executive leaders be directly elected.[45] Since the implementation of decentralization in 2001, the central government has devolved control over public service provision to the municipalities and districts,[46] and the number of districts and municipalities have increased by 60%.[47]

Along with decentralization, Indonesia has also embarked on broad political reforms after the country transitioned to democracy. Whereas previously presidents were chosen by a majority vote of parliament members, who were in turn elected with a closed-list proportional representative system, now they are elected directly by a majority vote every 5 years. Barring clear winners in the first round, the two front-runner pairs who receive the highest percentage of the national votes in the first round will compete in a run-off election. Voters also elect their representatives for the district, provincial, and national legislatures and the regional representative council every 5 years, in elections that use the open-list proportional representative system that happen in the same year as the presidential elections. Beyond presidential and legislative elections, eligible voters now elect their governors and mayors or district chiefs in direct executive elections, locally known as *Pilkada* or *Pemilukada*. These elections occur

every 5 years, and were first implemented in approximately half of the districts and municipalities in Indonesia in 2005.[48] Since 1998, Indonesia has now staged four presidential elections (1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014), four legislative and regional representatives elections (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014), and over a thousand direct elections of local executives. This double burden of simultaneous political and economic reforms following democratic transition is similar to what has been observed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary,[49] Uganda,[50] Nigeria,[51] Brazil,[52] and Vietnam.[53]

Beyond its political and economic reforms, Indonesia is ethnically diverse and has had bouts of communal violence in recent years. In the last two decades, the country has had outbursts of ethnocommunal riots,[54] separatist clashes in Aceh and Papua,[55] anti-ethnic and religious minorities violence,[56] and terrorist attacks.[57] These series of violent events are episodic and locally concentrated,[58] and have mostly declined since the early 2000s.[59] In this manner, Indonesia is not unlike other ethnically diverse countries such as Nigeria,[60] Kenya,[61] Myanmar,[62] and Timor-Leste,[63] which have recently democratized and have had bouts of communal violence.[64]

Another reason why Indonesia is an appropriate choice for studying electoral violence is because of its subnational heterogeneity in both electoral violence and socio-economic and political characteristics. Although neither elections nor violence are new to Indonesia, electoral violence is a relatively locally concentrated and infrequent event.[65] The first three national elections after 1998 were relatively violence-free, even after the two largest parties in Indonesia called for a rerun after the 2009 legislative election and were denied.[66] Incidents that did happen mostly revolved around local contests. Tadjoeddin[67] reports that 23% of the 282 Pilkada elections in 2005 through 2007 had incidents of electoral violence. The International Crisis Group observes that approximately 10% of the Pilkada elections were fraught with violence.[68] This variation across districts indicates that some districts remained peaceful during elections, whereas others did not. With systematic and granular sub-national data, scholars can examine why this was the case.

Data

In this section, we describe the data sources we used to code the direct local executive (DLE, henceforth) elections in Indonesia and the violence that surrounds them. Since there is no single source that documents these elections, we use a combination of official and internet sources to build an original and comprehensive dataset of DLE elections in Indonesia. While there are different data sources on political violence in Indonesia, we use the one that documents election violence in a comprehensive manner during the time period 2005–2012. We further present descriptive statistics of the number of DLE elections and examine interesting patterns in the violence associated with these elections from both a spatial and temporal perspective.

Elections

There is no single data source that documents direct local executive elections in Indonesia. To the best of our knowledge, the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA) is the only dataset that systematically records sub-national elections in various countries.[69] For

Indonesia, however, they only code legislative elections. So we used a combination of data compiled by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO), and Election Commission of Indonesia (KPU). Where there were discrepancies, we cross-checked with online news and candidates' complaint submissions to the Constitutional Court.

During the period 2005–2012, we coded a total of 911 DLE elections.[70] These include second-round elections, two of which were conducted in 2013. These elections covered three types of geographical units: districts (or *kabupatens*), cities (or *kotas*), and provinces. The bulk of these these elections (77%) were held in districts, around 18% in cities, and the rest were held at the provincial level. As long as a unit was formed before 2012 and had one election, it is included in our sample. Around 59% of units had two elections and little more than 8% had three elections, the maximum number of DLE elections for a unit.

The first elections for these units were held in 2005, the beginning of our sample. Typically, the officials who win these DLE elections hold office for about 5 years and hence there should be a staggered distribution of elections over time. Figure 1 shows the distribution of elections over time and as we would expect, around 50% of the elections took place during the years 2005 and 2010. About 18% took place in 2008 while the other years had roughly the same number of elections. The exception was 2009, which only witnessed two DLE elections.

There is also considerable spatial variation in the number of elections across Indonesia both across the country and within different provinces. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of elections during the period 2005–2012. Almost all districts within the country have held at least one election. Only 3% of units did not hold a DLE election mainly because they were created after 2012 or because they contain natural barriers like lakes, forests, and reservoirs.

Electoral violence

Earlier empirical works on contemporary political violence in Indonesia have mostly relied on two data sources: the UNSFIR dataset that was compiled based on a reading of provincial newspapers by a team of researchers commissioned by the United Nations,[71]



Figure 1. Elections by year.



Figure 2. Number of elections across Indonesia, 2005–2012.

and the village surveys Indonesian Village Census (PODES), which for some years included questions related to communal violence.[72] While these data sources have certain advantages (i.e., the PODES survey, for example, allows for a village-level analysis), the newly available National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS, henceforth) data presents far more thorough and fine-grained information of violence in Indonesia in the last two decades.[73]

A team of researchers read and coded multiple local newspapers for every province, following a standardized coding template.[74] An incident is counted as violence if the actions inflict or may cause physical harm on humans or property, and the actions are intentional.[75] Depending on the incidents' trigger as described in the newspaper accounts, they are then coded as conflict, domestic violence, crime, law enforcement, or unclear.[76] Incidents under conflict are further subcategorized as: ethnocommunal, separatist, resource-related, governance-related, electoral, and vigilante. For each of these events, coders reported where and when they occurred, their property and casualty impact, actors involved, motivating issues, weapons used (if any), and corresponding response from authorities. As a result, NVMS offers the most fine-grained event-level data of various types of violence in Indonesia for a period of almost 15 years.

For our purposes, we focus on incidents that NVMS categorized as electoral violence. Each incident comes with a narrative account of the event which NVMS coders had recorded from the local newspapers and sources. We read through these and further disaggregated the events into incidents that were DLE election-related vs. those that were not. During the period 2005–2012, there have been over 1,000 incidents of violence around elections. Figure 3 presents the proportion of election-related violent incidents over time for direct local executive elections. It shows that election violence is a steady problem in Indonesia and occurs every year. This is not to say that every election witnesses violence; around 20% of elections in our sample had some form of election violence associated with it.[77]



Figure 3. Election violence by year.

Not all units in Indonesia experienced DLE election-related violence. Figure 4 shows the mean levels of violence across different districts and cities in the country. Units in Aceh, Maluku, and Nusa Tenggara witnessed higher levels of election violence than other regions of Indonesia. In addition, there is also considerable variation within provinces like Sulawesi and Papua. These differences both within and across regions reflect an important point in the study of election violence: using aggregate measures of violence at the national level in cross-country analyses obscures the critical differences within a country. Understanding these distinctions is crucial if we are to advance the study of electoral violence.



Figure 4. Mean violence levels around elections. The figure presents the mean levels of election violence in direct local executive elections.

Overall election violence trends

When presenting violence trends around an election, the appropriate timeframe surrounding the event can have important implications. The wider the timeframe, the more incidents would be included in the analysis but also the greater the likelihood that the incidents may have less to do with the most proximate DLE election. Smaller timeframes, on the other hand, would not incorporate as many observations but would capture the period where voters are most likely to be motivated by issues surrounding the DLE election. The existing literature has used a variety of timeframes: Goldsmith[78] applies both prolonged and protracted timeframes of 36 months and 4 months. Other scholars have used cut-off points at 2 months, 4 months, 6 months, and even a whole year.[79] In the analysis below, we present results using the two cut-offs (30 days and 180 days) for trends over time and one cut-off (30 days) for trends over space.[80]

In Figure 5, we show the patterns of violence around a DLE election. As we discussed earlier, the goal of election-related violence is to influence the outcome, and so we should expect the number of incidents to increase as we get closer to an election. Violence that occurs before an election seeks to shape the future electoral outcome and so violent events tend to ramp up as we get closer to the election date. Similarly, given that the goal of post-election violence is to alter announced election results, actors expect their violent acts to have the highest possibility of revoking the election results immediately following election day. This is exactly what we observe in Figure 5.[81] Using either the 30-day or the 180-day to election cut-off, we consistently find that the highest number of incidents occur just before an election or immediately afterwards.



Figure 5. Violence levels around elections. The left/right figure presents the distribution of election-related violence using a 30/180-day cut-off around the election date.

Patterns of election violence over space also give us important insights. We discussed the spatial variation of election violence in Figure 4, and showed that not all places have the same propensity of exhibiting election-related violence. In Figure 6, we present patterns from both pre- and post-DLE election violence. As we would expect, there is considerable variation in the spatial distribution of violence levels before and after election violence. Some of the highest levels of pre-election violence exists in provinces like Aceh and Papua, places that are also plagued with separatist-related violence.[82] Districts that exhibit post-election violence are not the same as those that experience pre-election violence. Higher levels of post-election violence are prevalent in provinces like Kalimantan and Maluku, places that also experience ethnocommunal violence.[83]



Figure 6. Mean violence levels before/after elections. The top/bottom figure presents the mean levels of pre-/post-election violence in direct local executive elections.

In sum, there are significant temporal and spatial variations in election violence across Indonesian districts. They present interesting trends even when we examine just pre- and post-election violence around direct local executive elections. Consistent with other studies, we find that election-related violence tends to increase closer to the polling day. However, we also show that not all places exhibit the same propensity of election-related violence. Higher levels of pre-election violence are associated with places that also experience separatist violence whereas higher levels of post-election violence are associated with places that also exhibit ethnocommunal violence. Taken together, these patterns point to the importance of examining election violence at the sub-national level, and that national level aggregations in cross-national studies would obscure some of these interesting trends.

Types of election violence

Distinguishing between pre- and post-election violence is useful since actors sometimes pursue differing strategies during these periods. However, it would still diffuse the interesting patterns of electoral violence based on the targets of violence. As discussed earlier in this article, we introduce a typology based on the targets of intimidation: candidates, voters, or government agencies. In order to categorize electoral events in NVMS based on this typology, we exploit the fact that NVMS provides narrative accounts of each incident. We use keywords commonly used in the narrative accounts, and sort the incidents into the sub-categories we have outlined.

Figure 7 presents the distribution of the candidate-, voter- and government agency-targeting around DLE elections. The top panel uses a 30-day cut-off and the bottom panel uses a 180-day cut-off around the election date. There are at least three striking insights about election violence that we can gain from these graphs. First, we see that candidate-targeting occurs far more frequently comparing the three types of election violence. Around 35% of the 180 days around an election witnessed candidate-targeting, followed by voter-targeting at 25% and government agency-targeting at just 17%. This striking difference continues even as we get closer to an election. Around 61% of the 30 days around an election witnessed candidate-targeting, followed by voter-targeting at 52% and government agency-targeting at just 34%. These descriptive statistics suggest that all three types of targeting tend to increase in frequency closer to the election date, but that targeting candidates remains the favored strategy compared to voter- and government agency-targeting.

Second, we see that the three types of election violence exhibit different intensities. Candidate-targeting is again the most prevalent among the three types of electoral violence, followed by government-aimed and voter mobilization violence. The mean number of violent events involving candidate-targeting on any given day around an election is 2.6 times higher than those targeting government agencies and 3 times higher than those involving voters. Moreover, the maximum number of violent events also favors the strategy of candidate-targeting. On any given day, the maximum levels of candidate targeting is 1.3 times higher than those involving government agencies and 3.7 higher than those targeting voters. These suggest that the emphasis in the existing literature on how election violence is used primarily to prime voters overlooks a significant number of other types of electoral violence



Figure 7. Candidate, voter, and government agency targeting around elections. The top/bottom panel presents the distribution of three different types of election-related violence using a 30/180-day cut-off around the election date.

As per their names, these typologies of electoral violence differ in the identity of the targets, but they also vary in the number of people affected/mobilized and the duration and level of coordination needed to carry out these acts. Importantly, these types differ in their timing: Based on Figure 7, it is evident that candidate-targeting violence is much more prevalent before an election. More than 63% of candidate-targeting happens before an election and this is what we would expect, especially given that the goal is to intimidate potential challengers. It turns out that, at least in Indonesia, candidate-targeting violence, not voter-targeting, is the more frequently used strategy for reducing the level of electoral competitiveness. On the other hand, government agency-targeting is more common after an election. Around 58% of government agency-targeting takes place after an election, and this trend is what we would expect when regulators have the power to alter election results or disqualify candidates. Violence targeting voters is more evenly split before (54%) and after an election.

Taken together, these patterns paint an interesting picture of when different targets are singled out during election-related violence. When seeking the determinants of why some places exhibit high levels of electoral violence whereas other regions conduct fairly peaceful balloting, we emphasize the importance of understanding when certain strategies are employed and why they might be more prevalent in some areas than others. For such an analysis, aggregating electoral violence at the national level would be insufficient, because the logic of why candidates, voters, and government agencies are targeted may be driven

by local contexts. A sub-national analysis of these types of election violence will provide us with a richer and more robust understanding of the phenomenon.

Beyond Indonesia

The systematic use of violence to intimidate candidates directly is found not only in Indonesia, but is prevalent in other parts of the world as well. In the same way, candidates in many parts of the world have been disqualified early in the election cycle and their supporters have accused election committees of deliberately removing worthy candidates. In this section, we show that the Philippines, Mexico, Colombia, Uganda, and Italy have had a long history of political actors implementing similar strategies to shrink the arena of competition in their favor.

In 2009, 57 people, many of whom were journalists, were killed as gunmen allegedly hired by a local warlord in Maguindanaou, southern Philippines, attacked a group of people to stop an opposition candidate from registering his candidacy.[84] To this day, the perpetrators of this massacre have yet to be tried for their crimes. More recently, in anticipation of the May 2016 elections, a fresh wave of electoral violence targeted candidates and supporters. Armando Ceballos, a candidate for mayor in the southern Philippines, was shot dead in May 2016. At the time of his murder, 15 people had been killed in violence related to national elections.[85]

Similarly, in Italy from 1992 through 1995, the Sicilian Mafia embarked on an intimidation campaign against national politicians who supported Article 41-bis of the Penal Code, which imposes harsh sentences for members of the crime organization.[86] Among those who died was Pio La Torre, the head of the Italian Communist Party in Sicily.[87]

The same strategy of intimidating candidates in order to remove them from an upcoming race was also practiced in parts of Central and Latin America. According to a report published by Colombia's Mision de Observacion Electoral (MOE), a civilian election observer group, in the period leading up to the October 2015 local elections for governors, mayors, and deputy and council members in Colombia, 14 candidates were assassinated, "54 received death threats, 16 survived attacks, one candidate disappeared and four candidates were kidnapped."[88] In Mexico, in March 1994, Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI presidential candidate, was shot dead at a public rally in Tijuana. A few months later, José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, president of the PRI, was also murdered in Mexico City.[89] Since then, more than 100 political candidates have been targeted with violence, ranging from threats to murder. In the 2010 municipal elections, candidate Yolanda Cifuentes dropped out of the race because of explicit threats she received.[90] Nava Gonzalez, a mayoral candidate in Mexico's state of Guerrero, was kidnapped and killed 3 months before the June 2015 elections. In the preceding year, Gonzalez's son was kidnapped. Her husband was mayor of the same town from 2009–2012 before he was brutally shot in June 2014.[91]

Beyond intimidation of candidates, the strategy of mounting violence against government bodies perceived to unfairly manipulate electoral procedures to benefit favored candidates is also practiced in various countries. Senator Grace Poe, a presidential candidate in the 2016 Philippines election, was initially disqualified by the COMELEC, the Philippines Elections Committee, on grounds of her failure to meet the 10-year residency requirement for presidential candidates. Poe attributed her disqualification to

her rivals, Jejomar Binay and Mar Roxas, both of whom would gain votes if she were out of the race. Her supporters took to the streets and demanded that Poe be reinstated as a candidate.[92] Eventually, a Supreme Court ruling allowed Poe to continue her candidacy and compete in the May 9 elections.[93] Similarly in Uganda, parliamentary candidate Gerald Kawamara was disqualified from the 2016 legislative race in Uganda. His disqualification has triggered protests against the government.[94]

In sum, the typologies of electoral violence and the patterns we describe in this article are not unique to Indonesia. They are real strategies that political actors consider and implement with varying consequences, and they need to be examined carefully to extend what we know of electoral violence.

Conclusion

This article begins with the simple observation that of the various kinds of elections-related violence that occurred around the world, many incidents targeted candidates and government agencies considered responsible for holding elections. The assassinations of election candidates in the Philippines, Colombia, and Mexico are some amongst many. Protests against government agencies that disqualified popular candidates in Iraq, Uganda, and Indonesia are some examples of government-targeted violence. Yet, most of what we know about electoral violence has focused on incidents that intimidate voters to participate (or not) on election day and vote for particular candidates. The distinction between voter-, candidate-, and government-targeted violence has thus far been understudied.

This gap in the literature in part has to do with a lack of disaggregation of electoral violence. Another reason is that existing data sources on elections-related violence are usually set up at the national level, with no narrative accounts of the incidents, and few details on the identity of the actors engaged in violence, and the timing and location of incidents vis-à-vis elections.

In this article, we build upon the works of scholars who recognize the importance of disaggregating election violence by types of actors and their goals. Where we differ from earlier works is that we focus on the targets of intimidation, rather than the perpetrators of violence, based on how targeting different actors would help aspiring candidates achieve their goal of reducing the competitiveness of an election. We introduce three different types of electoral violence: voter-targeting, candidate-targeting, and government-aimed violence. Using a new event dataset of election violence based on local newspaper reports, and an original dataset of district level executive elections in Indonesia around which these incidents occurred, we found very interesting patterns.

First, we find that of all the incidents of electoral violence observed in our data, the majority of them were candidate-targeting and government-aimed violence, not voter-targeting violence. Second, we observe that candidate-targeting attacks tend to happen before election day, whereas voter-targeting incidents are spread out evenly before and after elections and government-targeted violence tend to occur after elections. Third, formerly separatist areas such as Aceh and Papua seem to have a higher concentration of incidents of pre-election violence than most districts, and districts with previous ethnocommunal violence exhibit higher levels of post-election violence than their counterparts. These patterns suggest that voter-targeting electoral violence differs from candidate-intimidating and government-targeting attacks both spatially and temporally, and that

continuing to overlook these distinct typologies of violence would undermine what we know about electoral violence. To understand electoral violence properly, scholars would need to examine when and why political hopefuls adopt these different strategies.

Given the target-based typology we have developed and the electoral violence and DLE election data now available, we outline several questions that can be examined to sharpen our understanding of electoral violence. First, what kinds of districts exhibit one type of electoral violence more frequently over others? Second, what drives political actors to target voters vs. candidates vs. government agencies? What do we know about their mobilizational and coordination constraints that can explain the patterns we see? To what extent do political actors have control over the actions of the police and other domestic security forces? Third, why do we see more candidate-targeting and government-agency-aimed violence before an election, not afterwards? Fourth, what explains the link between previous levels of separatist activities and pre-election violence, and the relationship between prior ethnocommunal violence and post-election violence? We believe that our data allow for rich and nuanced inquiries into these questions. Leveraging the rich descriptive narratives of violent events and our data on subnational elections in Indonesia, we can examine the local determinants of pre-election and post-election violence and the type of targets it involves. In particular, we can examine where and when candidate-targeting before an election is a more preferred strategy over voter-targeting violence. Drawing upon the broader literature on legacies of prior violence, we can expect targeting of election violence depends in large part on the local supply of mobilizable actors.

Acknowledgments

We thank Audrey Sacks for generously sharing the World Bank National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) data with us. Our work would also not have been possible without the help and generosity of numerous individuals at Indonesia's General Elections Committee (KPU), Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) in Jakarta. Rachel Quek provided excellent research assistance. Our manuscript benefited from insightful comments from the participants of the Yale-NUS Social Science Faculty brownbag, and the editor and anonymous reviewers at *Terrorism and Political Violence*. All remaining errors are ours.

Notes

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3. UNDP, *Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia*. Tech. rep. United Nations Development Programme, 2011.
4. *USA Today*, "Protests Held in Iraq amid Row over Election Ban," February 2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2010-02-07-election-iraq-protests_N.htm (accessed June 15, 2016).
5. We define electoral violence broadly as incidents of physical coercion, violence, and intimidation that are meant to manipulate electoral outcomes, before, during, and after an election. In this article, we use the terms *electoral violence, violence*, and *elections-related violence* interchangeably.

6. Steven Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
7. Ursula Daxecker, "All Quiet on Election Day? International Election Observation and Incentives for Pre-election Violence in African Elections," *Electoral Studies* 34 (2014): 232–43. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.006. http://ursuladaxecker.weebly.com/uploads/2/6/1/8/2618117/daxecker_jpr_494_final_version.pdf
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9. Paul Staniland, "Violence and Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 47, no. 1 (October 2014): 99–118. doi:10.5129/001041514813623128.
10. We exploit the narrative accounts of each incident provided in the dataset, and sort the incidents into the sub-categories we have outlined. More details of the categorization are provided later in this paper.
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15. Staniland, "Violence and Democracy" (see note 9 above).
16. Ibid.
17. Kristine Hoglund,"Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 3 (2009): 412–27; Ursula Daxecker, "The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-election Violence in Africa," *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 4 (2012): 503–16.
18. Often, post-election violence takes shape in the form of protests. However, not all post-election violence are protests. Borzyskowski (Inken Borzyskowski, "Sore Losers? International Condemnation and Domestic Incentives for Post-Election Violence," Working Paper, Aug. 2013) highlights that almost half of the incidents in post-election violence in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2008 did not start with a protest.
19. Straus and Taylor, "Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (1990–2008)" (see note 12 above).
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42. Staniland, "Violence and Democracy" (see note 9 above).
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44. The latter is most usually the country's elections committee, but could also be any government agency that is perceived to play a role in shaping decisions regarding elections. These decisions include, for example, candidacy requirements, registration deadlines and procedures, election day logistics provision, etc.
45. Indonesia has four layers of administrative units: province, districts and municipalities (both considered to be the second layer of government, with districts typically considered as more rural than municipalities), sub-districts, and lastly, villages. In our article, we refer to districts and municipalities simply as districts because the two administrative units are at the same layer of government.
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59. Jan Pierskalla and Audrey Sacks, "Unpacking the Effects of Decentralization on Local Conflict: Lessons from Indonesia" (Working Paper, August 2015).
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69. Ken Kollman et al., *Constituency-Level Elections Archive* (Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan [producer and distributor], May 2016).
70. These include second-round elections, two of which were conducted in 2013.
71. Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean, "Creating Datasets in Information-Poor Environments: Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990–2003)" (see note 54 above); Risa J. Toha, "Political Competition and Ethnic Riots in Democratic Transition: A Lesson from Indonesia," *British Journal of Political Science* FirstView (September 2015): 1–21. issn:1469-2112. doi: 10.1017 /S0007123415000423. http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0007123415000423
72. Tajima, "The Institutional Basis of Intercommunal Order: Evidence from Indonesia's Democratic Transition" (see note 54 above); Alexander De Juan, Jan Pierskalla, and Johannes Vullers, "The Pacifying Effects of Local Religious Institutions: An Analysis of Communal Violence in Indonesia," *Political Research Quarterly* 68, no. 2 (2015): 211–44.
73. NVMS is a marked improvement from PODES, for example, because the PODES surveys are only conducted every few years. Some scholars have highlighted overreporting of incidents and casualty of violence in high-conflict areas, and underreporting in low-conflict areas: Patrick Barron, Sana Jaffrey, and Ashutosh Varshney, "How Large Conflicts Subside: Evidence from Indonesia," *Indonesia Social Development Paper* 18 (July 2014): 1–23. Compared to the initial UNSFIR dataset on communal violence in Indonesia, NVMS is better because UNSFIR data coverage stopped at 2003 and was mostly focused on highly violent incidents. See Barron, Jaffrey, and Varshney, "How Large Conflicts Subside: Evidence from Indonesia" for details on the coverage of NVMS.
74. Known gaps in the newspaper reports were supplemented with a careful reading of academic texts, local NGO reports, and consultations with local experts: Barron, Jaffrey, and Varshney, "How Large Conflicts Subside: Evidence from Indonesia" (see note 73 above).
75. Pierskalla and Sacks, "Unpacking the Effects of Decentralization on Local Conflict: Lessons from Indonesia" (see note 59 above).

76. Barron, Jaffrey, and Varshney, "How Large Conflicts Subside: Evidence from Indonesia" (see note 73 above).
77. This is similar to the proportion cited in Tadjoeddin: Tadjoeddin, "Electoral Conflict and the Maturity of Local Democracy in Indonesia: Testing the Modernisation Hypothesis" (see note 67 above), who examined local elections in Indonesia from 2005–2007.
78. Goldsmith, "Electoral Violence in Africa Revisited" (see note 13 above).
79. Linebarger and Salehyan, "Elections and Social Conflict in Africa, 1990–2009" (see note 13 above); Straus and Taylor, "Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2008" (see note 12 above); Daxecker, "The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-election Violence in Africa" (see note 17 above); David Cingranelli and Mikhail Filippov, "Electoral Rules and Incentives to Protect Human Rights," *The Journal of Politics* 72 (January. 2010): 243–57; Klaus and Mitchell, "Land Grievances and the Mobilization of Electoral Violence: Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya" (see note 41 above).
80. The patterns are similar even when we use other cut-off points such as ± 45, 60, 90, and 120 days to/from a DLE election. These graphs and maps are available upon request.
81. It is important to note that this pattern does not imply elections cause violence: holding elections is associated with higher levels of violence around it, but these elections also serve to decrease violence levels at other times: S. P. Harish and Andrew Little, "The Political Violence Cycle," *American Political Science Review* (forthcoming).
82. Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Muhammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, *Explaining Collective Violence in Contemporary Indonesia: From Conflict to Cooperation* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
83. John T. Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Gerry van Klinken, *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007).
84. Emily Rauhala, "It's Been Five Years Since the Maguindanao Massacre and the Perpetrators Are Still Free," November 2014, http://time.com/3598796/its-been-five-years-since-the-maguindanao-massacre-and-the-perpetrators-are-still-free/ (accessed June 14, 2016).
85. *Channel News Asia*, "Mayor Candidate Shot Dead in Philippine Election Violence," May 2016, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/mayor-candidate-shot-dead/2765090.html (accessed June 14, 2016).
86. Alberto Alesina, Salvatore Piccolo, and Paolo Pinotti, "Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics" (NBER Working Paper No. 22093, 2016).
87. Many other public officials, supporters, and candidates of the left-wing party have suffered a similar fate at the hands of the mafia. Of the total 143 homicides of local administrators in Italy from 1974 through 2013, 104 occurred in regions controlled by the mafia: Sicily, Campania, and Calabria: Alesina, Piccolo, and Pinotti, "Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics" (see note 86 above).
88. Adriaan Alsema, "14 Candidates Killed: Colombia Steps Up Security ahead of Local Elections" (Colombia Report, 2015), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:d3UaOxQi_MoJ:colombiareports.com/14-candidates-killed-colombia-steps-up-security-ahead-of-local-elections/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=sg& client=safari.
89. *New York Times*, "New Look at a Mexican Murder,". Mar. 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/01/opinion/new-look-at-a-mexican-murder.html (accessed 14 June 2016).
90. Ley, "Violence and Citizen Participation in Mexico: From the Polls to the Streets" (see note 36 above).
91. David Gagne, "Political Candidate in Mexico Murdered as Elections Near March 2015," http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/political-candidate-murdered-in-mexico-as-elections-near (accessed June 14, 2016).
92. *Channel News Asia*, "Supporters Outraged after Philippine Presidency Frontrunner Disqualified," December 2015, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/supporters-outraged-after/2312574.html (accessed June 14, 2016).

93. Fiona Nicolas, "Supreme Court Allows Grace Poe to Run for President," March 2016, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/03/08/supreme-court-decision-final-allows-grace-poe-run-for-president.html (accessed June 14, 2016).
94. *Uganda Radio Network*, "NRM Supporters Protest Ntoroko Candidate Disqualification," February 2016, http://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/nrm-party-supporters-protest-disqualification-of-candidate (accessed June 14, 2016).